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The purpose of this effort is to develop, demonstrate, and evaluate three asymmetric thrust 
detection approaches to aid in the reduction of asymmetric thrust-induced aviation accidents.  
This paper presents the results from that effort and their evaluation in simulation studies, 
including those from a real-time flight simulation testbed. Asymmetric thrust is recognized as 
a contributing factor in several Propulsion System Malfunction plus Inappropriate Crew 
Response (PSM+ICR) aviation accidents.  As an improvement over the state-of-the-art, 
providing annunciation of asymmetric thrust to alert the crew may hold safety benefits.  For 
this, the reliable detection and confirmation of asymmetric thrust conditions is required. For 
this work, three asymmetric thrust detection methods are presented along with their results 
obtained through simulation studies. Representative asymmetric thrust conditions are 
modeled in simulation based on failure scenarios similar to those reported in aviation incident 
and accident descriptions. These simulated asymmetric thrust scenarios, combined with actual 
aircraft operational flight data, are then used to conduct a sensitivity study regarding the 
detection capabilities of the three methods.  Additional evaluation results are presented based 
on pilot-in-the-loop simulation studies conducted in the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) 
flight simulation testbed. Data obtained from this flight simulation facility are used to further 
evaluate the effectiveness and accuracy of the asymmetric thrust detection approaches. 
Generally, the asymmetric thrust conditions are correctly detected and confirmed.  
I. Introduction 
symmetric thrust is cited as the cause of several loss of control aviation incidents and accidents.1,2,3 As noted in 
the propulsion system malfunction plus inappropriate crew response (PSM+ICR) reports, the detection of 
unintended asymmetric thrust conditions needs to be performed in a timely manner in order for there to be sufficient 
time for recovery.  This effort was part of a feasibility study that evaluated three asymmetric thrust detection methods.  
This paper presents the results from that study which was conducted in simulation to demonstrate that asymmetric 
thrust conditions can be detected.  In addition, to test effectively any proposed asymmetric thrust detection method, a 
realistic flight simulation environment is necessary.  The NASA GRC flight simulation laboratory provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed methods with a pilot-in-the-loop.  However, additional work 
would be necessary to address whether this information should be annunciated to the flight crew   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The paper begins with a section that provides the motivation 
for this work and describes the significance and improvement over state of the art.  Following that, the description of 
three developed asymmetric thrust detection methods is provided.  Next, results from a simulation-based sensitivity 
study and the application of these methods in a real-time flight simulation laboratory are presented.  Finally, a 
summary that outlines the effectiveness of the asymmetric thrust detection approaches is presented along with 
generalized concluding remarks about the research effort. 
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II. Motivation 
A. Significance 
As previously noted, asymmetric thrust is cited as the cause of several Loss of Control aviation incidents and 
accidents.  The sequence of events that lead to a PSM+ICR event can be described as follows.  In a typical scenario, 
the aircraft’s autopilot is being used by the crew and the autothrottle control is engaged.  Due to a failure, an unintended 
asymmetric thrust condition occurs while the autopilot and autothrottle are engaged.  Due to the automated flight 
control systems, the asymmetric thrust condition is initially managed, but it progressively increases because the flight 
controls reach their limits of effective control.  When the autopilot disengages and the crew takes over control, there 
may not be enough control authority for the crew to sufficiently control the aircraft.  In addition, the crew’s response 
may be inappropriate and exacerbate the situation.  
If the flight crew is aware of the developing thrust asymmetry, they should be able to identify the cause and take 
preventive or corrective action.  Therefore, the detection of the asymmetric thrust condition is needed, and the 
annunciation of asymmetric thrust may be beneficial in warning the flight crew.  However, as indicated in the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) report4 for indications of propulsion system malfunctions, there are risks associated 
with thrust asymmetry annunciation and the only time when annunciation may be practical is when the autopilot is 
engaged.  Many of the reported incidents and accidents of thrust asymmetry by themselves were not so significant that 
they were not recoverable.  In addition, aircraft are required to be controllable in extreme asymmetric thrust conditions 
throughout typical flight profiles. For the purposes of this effort, the asymmetric thrust condition that leads to aircraft 
upset and to loss of control is of interest.  Typically that condition occurs due to the lack of reaction or from the 
inappropriate action of the flight crew. It is in this way that an asymmetric thrust condition can become unmanageable.  
B. Improvement over State of the Art 
The flight crew is responsible for recognizing and responding to unintended asymmetric thrust conditions. Today, 
this is done by the pilots monitoring available engine cockpit instrumentation such as rotor speeds or engine pressure 
ratio, which provide an indication of engine power. If an imbalance in the power produced by the aircraft’s engines is 
observed, the pilots must take appropriate action to address the issue.  It is possible, when the autopilot is being used, 
the thrust imbalance can actually be exacerbated. If the flight control system is continually correcting for thrust 
asymmetry, the limits of control authority could be approached.  In this case, recovery by the flight crew will be 
challenged by the suddenness of the event and the reduced margin for corrective action.  Depending on its design, the 
autopilot will disengage at some point as it becomes unable to maintain the desired input flight conditions (i.e., 
heading, airspeed, altitude).  When the autopilot disengages, the flight crew is given control of an aircraft that may 
have developed an unusual flight attitude with controls at or near their maximum deflection from the autopilot.  In 
these situations, recovery depends on the proper response and skill of the flight crew.  
As noted above, asymmetric thrust conditions can be masked from the flight crew when the automatic controls are 
being used. In order to add an alert for asymmetric thrust conditions, the thrust imbalance must be detected and 
confirmed when these controls are being used. The results of the research presented in this paper, will show that the 
detection and confirmation of asymmetric thrust conditions is possible. The simulation studies and pilot-in-the-loop 
tests that were conducted under this effort will show that reliable automated real-time detection of asymmetric thrust 
conditions is feasible. 
III. Asymmetric Thrust Detection and Confirmation 
For this research effort, three asymmetric thrust detection approaches are developed and evaluated. The first two 
are based on producing an estimate of the engine thrust for each engine and comparing those values with each other 
in order to determine a mismatch in the thrust. The first two approaches include a Kalman filter-based thrust estimation 
approach and a two-dimensional table lookup thrust estimation approach. The third method takes a fundamentally 
different approach. Instead of a monitoring for a mismatch in estimated thrust between engines it monitors for a 
mismatch between the commanded and actual power produced by an individual engine. This is done by monitoring 
the primary engine control parameter (typically either corrected fan speed or engine pressure ratio (EPR)), which is a 
proxy for the amount of thrust produced by the engine. If an engine is detected to be producing more/less thrust than 
commanded, that serves as confirmation that an asymmetric thrust condition is likely. The three detection approaches 
are described in the following sections. 
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A. Kalman Filter Approach 
A Kalman filter (KF) is an optimal linear estimator designed to estimate the unknown states of a dynamic system. 
It incorporates a dynamic model of the system and is designed to recursively update estimates by processing acquired 
system measurement data. Accounting for measurement noise and model uncertainty, the Kalman filter is designed to 
minimize the mean squared error in the estimated parameters. It is well suited for aircraft engine applications and 
several previous efforts have reported on the application of Kalman filters for onboard real-time aircraft engine 
performance estimation.5,6 In this study, an asymmetric thrust detection strategy based on Kalman filter estimation 
technology is considered.  Here, a Kalman filter is designed and applied for each engine installed on the aircraft. To 
account for the nonlinear behavior inherent in an aircraft gas turbine engine, a piecewise linear Kalman filter design 
is applied. Individual linear Kalman filters are designed spanning the entire engine operating envelope and then 
combined and scheduled applying interpolation to account for changes in engine operating condition. In addition to 
estimating the dynamic states of the engine, the Kalman filter is also constructed to estimate states reflective of 
turbomachinery performance deterioration.7,8 In this fashion, that Kalman filter is able to account for deterioration 
induced performance changes in the engine.  Additional details on the Kalman filter formulation and implementation 
for asymmetric thrust detection are provided in the subsections below. 
 
1. Kalman Filter Formulation 
The nonlinear model of an aircraft engine can be represented by the following equations 
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where x and u represent the vectors of engine state variables and control command inputs, respectively.  The vector h 
represents health parameters, such as efficiency or flow capacity, reflective of performance deterioration within the 
major modules of the engine. For given input values, the nonlinear functions f, g, and gz generate the vectors of state 
derivatives x , sensed engine outputs y, and unmeasured engine outputs such as net thrust denoted by z.  By linearizing 
the engine model at a given operating point, the following state-space equations are obtained: 
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Here, A, B, C, D, F, G, L, M, and N are the state-space matrices reflecting system dynamics. The trim vectors, 
denoted by the subscript “trim,” reflect the values of the state variables, commands, and measured and unmeasured 
outputs when the model is at steady-state (i.e., x  = 0) at the given operating point.  The vector href represents a 
reference health condition specified by the system designer. In Equation (2), parameter deviations relative to trim or 
reference conditions are denoted by the delta symbol ().  Through algebraic manipulation, Equation (2) can be re-
written to shift the health parameters to become state variables as shown in Equation (3): 
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Since engine performance deterioration evolves slowly in time, the health parameter states in Equation 3 are modeled 
without dynamics. Once the health parameters are augmented with the state variables, they can be estimated by 
applying a Kalman filter as long as the system is observable. However, a necessary condition for observability given 
the Equation 3 formulation is that there are at least as many measurements as health parameters.9 To construct a 
reduced-order state space system of appropriate dimension to enable Kalman filter formulation, consider a 
transformation matrix, V*, that maps the health parameter vector, h, to a tuning vector of lower dimension, q, such 
that: 
 
hVq *  (4) 
 
An approximation for h based on q can be calculated using the pseudo inverse of V*: 
qVh ˆˆ *  (5) 
Then, substituting Equation (5) into Equation (3) produces the following reduced-order state space system: 
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The choice of the transformation matrix is a design decision made prior to constructing the Kalman gains. In this 
study a technique, referred to as “optimal tuner selection,” is employed to produce a transformation matrix that is a 
linear combination of all health parameters, and constructed such that the mean squared estimation error in the 
parameters of interest are minimized.7 In this case, the transformation matrix was selected to minimize the estimation 
error in net thrust. Given Equation (6), a linear Kalman filter at a given operating point can be formulated as: 
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After individual linear Kalman filters are designed spanning the entire engine operating envelope, they are combined 
and scheduled applying interpolation to form the piecewise linear Kalman filter. 
 
2. Kalman Filter Implementation for Asymmetric Thrust Detection 
A block diagram of the piecewise linear Kalman filter implementation to estimate the thrust produced by an 
individual engine is shown in Figure 1.  The Kalman filter requires engine sensed measurements (y) and actuator 
inputs (u). Parameter correction is applied to improve the interpolation between grid points in the piecewise linear 
Kalman filter. Trim and matrix information corresponding to the current operating point are retrieved applying a three-
dimensional interpolation scheme using altitude, Mach, and corrected fan speed as the scheduling parameters. The 
Kalman filter produces estimated corrected output deltas from trim consisting of state variables (
xqxˆ ), sensed 
measurements ( cyˆ ), and net thrust ( czˆ ).  Corrected net thrust is produced by summing the estimated delta in net 
thrust, czˆ , and net thrust at the trim condition, ztrim.  
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Figure 1. Kalman Filter-based Thrust Estimation 
 
The Kalman filter estimated net thrust values for each engine are compared following the asymmetric thrust detection 
and confirmation logic as shown in Figure 2.  The absolute difference in estimated corrected net thrust between the 
two engines is calculated and then converted to an absolute percent of maximum thrust. This absolute percent error 
signal is then compared to a pre-established detection threshold. When an exceedance of this threshold is detected and 
then persists for an established time duration, the asymmetric thrust condition is confirmed and annunciated. 
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Figure 2. Asymmetric Thrust Detection and Confirmation Logic 
Relative to the other asymmetric thrust detection approaches considered in this study, the primary benefit offered by 
the Kalman filter is the estimation accuracy it enables. It is designed to account for transient engine behavior and 
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turbomachinery deterioration induced changes in engine performance. However, it is a relatively complex solution in 
terms of processing requirements compared to the other approaches described below. 
B. Table Lookup Approach 
This asymmetric thrust detection approach estimates the net thrust of each engine applying a two-dimensional 
table lookup approach based on corrected fan speed and Mach number as shown in Figure 3.  The lookup table data 
is created from steady state data generated using an engine model reflecting mid-life (i.e., 50% deteriorated) engine 
performance. The model is run at operating points over the entire flight envelope of the engine spanning a range of 
corrected fan speeds, Mach number, and altitude settings. Then, for each corrected fan speed and Mach number 
combination, corrected net thrust results generated over the range of altitudes considered are averaged to produce the 
two-dimensional lookup model.  
Net Thrust 
Table 
Lookup
Corrected Fan Speed
Mach
Estimated Corrected
Net Thrust
 
Figure 3. Table Lookup Thrust Estimation Approach 
An estimated corrected net thrust value is produced for each engine, then these estimated thrust values are processed 
applying the same asymmetric thrust detection and confirmation system as shown previously in Figure 2.  As 
compared to the Kalman filter approach, the table lookup method is simpler in design, which is a benefit for a flight 
software application. However, unlike the Kalman filter, the table lookup method does not account for engine 
performance deterioration or engine transient dynamics. 
C. Sensed and Commanded Power Comparison Approach 
The sensed and commanded power comparison approach is fundamentally different from the previously described 
Kalman filter and table lookup approaches.  Instead of estimating and comparing the thrust between engines, this 
approach monitors for a mismatch between commanded and delivered power in an individual engine. It does so by 
monitoring the engine’s control parameter, corrected fan speed or EPR for most turbofan engines, which serves as a 
proxy for the actual thrust produced by the engine. A block diagram representation of the approach is shown in Figure 
4.  Sensed power (i.e., corrected fan speed or EPR) is directly read from available engine measurements. Commanded 
power is based on the engine power setpoint control logic, which is a function of operating conditions (altitude, Mach, 
ambient temperature) and throttle power lever angle (PLA) setting. The logic compares sensed and commanded power 
setting, and if a mismatch of sufficient magnitude and persistency is found, a power mismatch condition is 
annunciated. A benefit of this approach is that it guards against thrust asymmetry alerts due to pilot-intentional split 
throttle command scenarios. The goal of this research is to identify methods capable of detecting unintended 
asymmetrical thrust conditions.  The two thrust estimation methods discussed require additional logic to suppress 
alerts when the asymmetric thrust is intended.  Additionally, the EPR comparison approach is able to provide an 
indication of which engine is the culprit for producing the asymmetric thrust condition—generally there should never 
be a mismatch between commanded and delivered EPR during nominal conditions.  Conversely, the previously 
described Kalman filter and table lookup approach are non-specific as they simply indicate that a thrust asymmetry 
exists. They do not aid in identifying which engine is malfunctioning. Like the previously described table lookup 
approach, the logic is relatively simple. However, unlike the Kalman filter approach, it does not account for engine 
performance deterioration.  
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Figure 4. Sensed and Commanded Power Comparison Approach 
 
IV. Application and Results 
This section will present simulation results illustrating the application and comparison of the three asymmetric 
thrust detection approaches. First, results from a Monte Carlo simulation study conducted to assess the detection 
sensitivity of the three approaches is presented. Then, results from the application of the approaches in a pilot-in-the 
loop flight simulation facility are presented.  
A. Asymmetric Thrust Detection Sensitivity Study 
In order to evaluate the detection sensitivity of the three asymmetric thrust approaches, a simulation study is 
conducted to quantify the average minimum thrust asymmetry that can be detected by each approach in the presence 
of representative system uncertainty. This study is conducted using the NASA-developed Commercial Modular Aero-
Propulsion System Simulation 40k (C-MAPSS40k), a high bypass turbofan engine model in the 40,000 pound thrust 
category.10 C-MAPSS40k is a generic turbofan engine model intended for controls and diagnostics research and 
development purposes. It includes a closed-loop controller with EPR as the primary engine control parameter. 
C-MAPSS40k sensor measurement, actuators, and input parameters are shown in Table 1.  C-MAPSS40k input 
parameters allow the engine to be operated over a range of operating conditions and power settings. Additional inputs 
allow the end user to specify the engine’s level of performance deterioration (ranging from a new engine to a fully 
degraded engine) and to enable the inclusion of representative sensor measurement noise in the engine outputs. 
Representative variations in these inputs are included in the sensitivity study to assess the accuracy of each of the three 
methods. Utilizing the C-MAPSS40k model, a piecewise linear Kalman filter and a two-dimensional table lookup 
model are constructed to estimate thrust over the entire engine operating envelope. The sensed and commanded power 
comparison approach is designed to compare sensed and commanded EPR. This is performed by comparing sensed 
EPR (the ratio of P5 to P2) to commanded EPR as specified by the C-MAPSS40k control logic.   
 
Table 1. C-MAPSS40k sensor measurements, actuators, and input parameters 
Sensor Measurements Actuators Inputs 
Nf Fan speed Wf Fuel flow Alt Altitude 
Nc Core speed VSV Variable stator vane MN Mach number 
P2 Inlet total pressure VBV Variable bleed valve PLA Power lever angle 
T2 Inlet total temperature   dTamb Ambient temperature deviation  
P25 HPC inlet total pressure    relative to standard day conditions 
T25 HPC inlet total temperature   Det Performance deterioration level 
Ps3 HPC exit static pressure   Noise Measurement noise enabled or  
T3 HPT exit total temperature    disabled (discrete input) 
P5 LPT exit total pressure     
T5 LPT exit total temperature     
 
Given the designs of the three asymmetry detection approaches, a Monte Carlo simulation study is conducted to 
assess and compare the sensitivity of the approaches. For the purposes of conducting this study, two C-MAPSS40k 
engine simulations are run in parallel to represent a twin engine aircraft. Each Monte Carlo trial is defined to be 10 
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minutes in duration and applies pseudo-randomly assigned simulation inputs of engine operating condition, 
deterioration level, and sensor measurement noise. Here, actual flight operating condition profiles are obtained from 
a commercial aircraft flight operation quality assurance (FOQA) data set. Quasi steady-state cruise segments 10 
minutes in duration are identified and extracted from the FOQA data set, and the corresponding time histories of 
altitude, Mach, and PLA serve as inputs into the C-MAPSS40k simulations. A total of 216 steady-state cruise segments 
were identified within the FOQA data set. Additionally, for each 10 minute trial the deterioration level of each engine 
is randomly assigned through the C-MAPSS40k deterioration parameter and sensor noise is enabled. 
To enable a common basis of comparison between the three asymmetric thrust detection approaches, detection 
logic for each approach was defined to produce a common false alarm rate. All three methods applied a threshold 
exceedance persistency check of 6.5 seconds in duration. The corresponding detection threshold was manually 
adjusted until two of the 216 steady-state cruise segments experienced a false alarm. For these cases, no thrust 
asymmetry existed beyond that caused by the different level of performance deterioration assigned to each engine and 
noise in the sensor measurements used by the closed-loop control system, which produce a relatively small mismatch 
in thrust. The thresholds applied for the three detection approaches are shown in Table 2.  It should be emphasized 
that the detection thresholds applied for this study are much smaller than what would be reasonable to implement in 
practice as a false alarm rate of 0.93% (2 of 216) vastly exceeds what would be considered acceptable. However, 
establishment of a common false alarm rate does provide a common basis in order to enable comparison of the 
methods.  
 
Table 2. Applied detection thresholds for the three asymmetric thrust detection approaches 
Method Threshold Persistency False Alarms 
Kalman filter 0.187 % 6.5 sec 2 of 216 trials 
Table lookup 0.087 % 6.5 sec 2 of 216 trials 
Sensed and commanded EPR comparison 0.95% 6.5 sec 2 of 216 trials 
 
 Given the defined detection thresholds for each method, the approaches were then evaluated and compared to 
determine their sensitivity in detecting asymmetric thrust events.  For this assessment, two C-MAPSS40k simulations 
were once again run in parallel to produce 10 minute time histories for a twin engine aircraft. As before, sensor 
measurement noise was enabled and inputs consisting of FOQA operating condition data and randomly assigned 
deterioration levels were applied. To simulate a thrust mismatch between the engines, engine #1 was setup to 
experience an uncommanded slow linear bias increase in PLA above its actual true PLA setting. This resulted in an 
overthrust condition for engine #1, where it produced more thrust than commanded. A Monte Carlo simulation study 
was conducted, and the average absolute percent thrust mismatch between the engines at the time of detection was 
quantified. This average is based on results from the same 216 steady-state cruise cases used to establish the detection 
thresholds. The results are summarized in Table 3 and show the average and standard deviation of the absolute percent 
corrected thrust asymmetry at the time of detection.  It is observed that the table lookup approach is able to detect the 
smallest levels of thrust asymmetry, followed by the Kalman filter approach, and then the EPR comparison approach. 
The table lookup approach relies on corrected fan speed to estimate thrust, because they are highly correlated variables. 
For C-MAPSS40k, the relationship between corrected fan speed and thrust is not significantly impacted by engine 
performance deterioration. Additionally, the corrected fan speed measurement noise is relatively small. As such, the 
table lookup method performs well in estimating and comparing engine produced thrust at the quasi-steady-state cruise 
conditions considered. The Kalman filter provides comparable performance to the table lookup model. The slight 
increase in average detectable thrust asymmetry is attributed to the sensor noise, which is more prominent in the 
additional C-MAPSS40k sensors used in the Kalman filter implementation. The sensed and commanded EPR 
comparison approach utilizes P2 and P5 sensor measurements to calculate sensed EPR. These sensors exhibit more 
noise than the fan speed sensor does. Additionally, there is a lag between commanded and delivered EPR which comes 
into play due to oscillations in the PLA command and operating conditions within the FOQA data. As such, the sensed 
vs. commanded EPR comparison approach exhibits a larger magnitude and standard deviation in its average minimum 
detectable thrust asymmetry. 
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Table 3. Average minimum level of detectable thrust asymmetry 
Method 
Average absolute percent of 
corrected thrust asymmetry at the 
time of detection  Standard Deviation 
Kalman filter 0.9664% 2.7792% 
Table lookup 0.7647% 2.1976% 
Sensed and commanded EPR comparison 2.7672% 4.0936% 
 
B. Piloted Flight Simulation Evaluation 
In order to further assess the capabilities of the asymmetric thrust detection approaches, a pilot-in-the-loop flight 
simulation evaluation is conducted where simulated failure scenarios causing asymmetric thrust conditions are 
introduced. This evaluation allow the techniques to be evaluated under more realistic operating conditions including 
transient operating conditions and pilot interactions with the aircraft. The subsections below will describe the test 
setup and example results of asymmetric thrust detection in the flight simulator environment. 
 
1. NASA GRC Flight Simulation Testbed 
The NASA GRC flight simulation testbed is capable of real-time piloted evaluation of the asymmetric thrust 
detection methods and provides a unique opportunity for this purpose. This demonstration vehicle generally meets 
FAA guidelines; so, it provides a valid test environment.11 In this study, the flight simulation testbed utilized the two-
engine transport class Model (TCM) aircraft simulation developed by NASA LaRC12 and the C-MAPPS40k model 
developed by NASA GRC for each engine. The integration of the TCM aircraft simulation and the C-MAPSS40k 
engine simulation is referred to as the TCM with enhanced engine control (EEC).  The TCM EEC has been used for 
NASA GRC aero-propulsion projects, and it serves as a realistic demonstration vehicle. Shown in Figure 5 is a picture 
of the cockpit from the flight simulation testbed. 
 
Figure 5 NASA GRC Flight Simulation Testbed 
2. Integration of the Asymmetric Thrust Failure Scenarios and Detection Methods 
Modifications to the TCM EEC flight simulation were completed for including the asymmetric thrust failure 
scenarios, which included stuck throttle failures as well as EPR-type failures.  For the stuck throttle failures, the ability 
to fail either throttle was implemented in the two-engine TCM EEC simulation.  From the reported incidents and 
accidents, the typical asymmetric thrust failure scenario usually involves one engine that is not responsive to throttle 
movement.  The EPR failure scenarios were implemented as failures in the EPR sensor or in the fuel meter valve 
(FMV) system.  
The three asymmetric thrust detection methods were integrated into the TCM EEC for subsequent evaluation.  The 
two detection methods based on comparing estimated thrust, the Kalman filter and table lookup approaches, were 
implemented as previously shown in Figure 2 and the EPR comparison approach was implemented as shown in Figure 
4.  For asymmetric thrust detection and confirmation all three methods applied a persistency check of 6.5 seconds.  
The estimated thrust mismatch threshold for the Kalman filter and the table lookup model was set to ten percent, and 
the EPR mismatch threshold was set to five percent.  The ten percent estimated thrust mismatch threshold was selected 
to be consistent with current engine failure indication logic activation levels4.  The ten percent thrust mismatch was 
selected as a practical threshold already implemented in the industry, whereas the thrust mismatch values identified 
in section IV provided a common ground for comparison between methods.  The threshold values obtained in section 
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IV are not practical for implementation in real world settings due to the considerable high false positive rate.  The five 
percent threshold applied for the EPR comparison approach was selected to provide the capability to detect comparable 
thrust imbalance levels of approximately 10%. 
C. Examples Asymmetric Thrust Failures 
From previous pilot-in-the-loop testing and the available accident reports and documentation, the stuck throttle 
failure provides realistic emergency conditions for the pilot to handle; so, it was used for this preliminary evaluation 
of the asymmetric thrust detection methods.  The modeled stuck throttle failures were evaluated in the GRC flight 
simulation testbed.  These pilot-in-the-loop tests were used to demonstrate the capabilities of the stuck throttle 
subsystems that were implemented in the TCM EEC.  The failure where the throttle is stuck at its last position at a 
user-defined time was selected as the failure scenario.  For this specific example, the pilot has finished the cruise 
portion of the flight and is starting to make the approach to land.  Without the pilot’s knowledge, the stuck throttle 
failure was inserted into the real-time flight simulation.  The pilot recognized that there was a throttle failure, but a 
comparison between the pilot’s reaction time and when the asymmetric thrust condition was detected was not 
evaluated.  Since, the primary purpose for this demonstration was to show the integration of the failure scenario and 
asymmetric thrust detection methods with the real-time flight simulation. 
Figure 6 shows an example of the correct detection and annunciation of an asymmetric thrust event based on the 
Kalman filter thrust estimation approach.  The top plot shows the estimated net thrust for engine one and engine two.  
At time equal to 15 seconds, engine one experiences a stuck throttle failure.  The middle plot shows the absolute net 
thrust difference between engines one and two along with the ten percent target detection threshold. The bottom plot 
shows the asymmetric thrust detection logic output.  Asymmetric thrust is correctly detected and confirmed after the 
event persists for greater than 6.5 seconds.  The other approaches were also found to be able to successfully detect 
simulated asymmetric thrust scenarios.  An analysis similar to the one that was performed for the sensitivity study was 
not repeated again due to the many pilot-in-the-loop simulations that would have to be performed.  Although, more 
than one pilot-in-the-loop test was performed, the results from those tests are similar to the one presented here.   
 
Figure 6. Detection and Confirmation of Asymmetric Thrust Based on the Kalman Filter Thrust Estimation Approach 
D. Discussion 
  
The three asymmetric thrust detection methods presented in this paper all performed as expected in detecting thrust 
asymmetry between engines of 10% or more, as demonstrated in a pilot-in-the-loop test. As such, all are potential 
candidates for detecting large asymmetric thrust events of the magnitude that might pose a safety concern. The two 
methods that monitored for a mismatch in the estimated thrust produced between engines (i.e., the Kalman filter and 
table lookup approach) were both found to be effective in detecting the simulated asymmetric thrust events. However, 
the Kalman filter is more complex, and was not found to yield a significant detection benefit over the simpler table 
lookup approach when applied to C-MAPSS40k. Additionally, some practical implementation challenges associated 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
11 
with the two thrust comparison methods are acknowledged. First, they can produce alarms in the event that an 
intentional split throttle setting exists. Additional logic would have to be added for the methods to suppress alerts 
when intentional asymmetric thrust is commanded.  For example, the detection logic could be designed to only be 
engaged when the automatic controls are activated and disengaged during all other times. Another limitation of the 
estimated thrust comparison approaches is that the detection of a thrust asymmetry is nonspecific and does not aid the 
crew in determining which engine is malfunctioning or why the engine is malfunctioning.4 Additional diagnostic logic, 
or manual troubleshooting would be necessary to determine the problem and the appropriate mitigating actions 
necessary to address the thrust asymmetry.  The sensed and commanded power setting comparison approach was also 
found to be an effective and simple design. Furthermore, it is able to identify the specific engine that is the culprit for 
producing either overthrust or a thrust shortfall. One issue with the sensed vs. commanded approach is that it is limited 
to detecting only those events that result in a mismatch between commanded and sensed power output. If there is an 
issue upstream such as a throttle linkage issue resulting in the wrong PLA command being provided to the detection 
logic, this approach will not be able to detect such a scenario. For any of the three detection methods considered, 
additional development and maturation would be necessary to enable practical implementation. For additional 
information on recommendations and challenges associated with providing aircraft indications of thrust asymmetry 
and other propulsion malfunctions, readers are referred to Ref. 4.  
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
The flight crew is responsible for recognizing and responding to unintended asymmetric thrust conditions. 
However, asymmetric thrust is often not recognized because of an increasing reliance on automated flight controls 
(i.e. autopilot). Therefore, an asymmetric thrust condition can be masked from the flight crew until a flight control 
limit is reached when recovery is difficult or not possible. Simulation studies conducted under this effort have shown 
that reliable automated real-time detection of asymmetric thrust conditions is feasible. Three asymmetric thrust 
detection approaches were developed and evaluated including two approaches designed to estimate and compare the 
thrust between engines (a Kalman filter thrust estimation technique and a corrected fan speed table lookup model) and 
a third approach designed to detect a mismatch between commanded and delivered Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) in 
an individual engine. The approaches were evaluated in the NASA GRC flight simulation testbed under a variety of 
failure scenarios. All approaches were found to be successful in detecting asymmetric conditions. In particular, for the 
stuck throttle failure, the asymmetric thrust detection and confirmation was shown to be successful.  
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